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In this paper, we argue that if Stephen Yablo (2005) is right that philoso-
phers of mathematics ought to endorse a ﬁctionalist view of number-talk,
then there is a compelling reason for deﬂationists about truth (henceforth,
T-deﬂationists) to endorse a ﬁctionalist view of truth-talk. More speciﬁcally,
our claim will be that, for T-deﬂationists, Yablo’s argument for mathemati-
cal ﬁctionalism can be employed and mounted as an argument for truth-
theoretic ﬁctionalism.
Yablo’s own ﬁctionalist account of number-talk is what he calls
“ﬁguralism”, a subspecies of pretense-involving ﬁctionalism, which is a
non-error-theoretic species of the genus philosophical ﬁctionalism, one
that allows that utterances can be true even if their operation involves
ﬁction. Now, while Yablo’s considerations—the ones with which we will
be concerned, in any case—are ultimately presented in the service of
motivating his particular pretense-involving ﬁctionalist account of
number-talk, we can and should take these considerations to support
mathematical ﬁctionalism more generally. Accordingly, while we will be
concerned with Yablo’s argument for the kind of mathematical ﬁc-
tionalism he endorses, the argument that we will present, in support of
T-deﬂationists endorsing ﬁctionalism about truth-talk, is not intended to
support a particular pretense-involving ﬁctionalist account of truth-talk.
To belabor the point, what we will show is that if Yablo’s considerations
in favor of some sort of ﬁctionalism about mathematics compel (and, for
what follows, we will assume that they do), then we have a reason for
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thinking that T-deﬂationists ought to endorse or adopt some sort of
ﬁctionalism about truth-talk.1
The plan is as follows. §1 discusses mathematical ﬁctionalism, with
special interest in Yablo’s ﬁctionalist view of mathematical discourse. §2
introduces the key elements of deﬂationism and explains T-deﬂationism in
particular. §3 explains why T-deﬂationists ought to endorse ﬁctionalism
about truth-talk; §4 considers, and responds to, some objections to our chief
claim; and §5 concludes.
1. Yablo’s Mathematical Fictionalism
Before turning to Yablo’s brand of mathematical ﬁctionalism, a few words
on ﬁctionalism. It is useful to distinguish the philosophy of ﬁction from
philosophical ﬁctionalism. The former is concerned with issues and ques-
tions that are about certain aspects of ﬁction, such as whether ﬁctional char-
acters (e.g., Sherlock Holmes) exist, about the aletheic status of claims from
a work of ﬁction or claims about a work of ﬁction’s content, etc. By con-
trast, rather than analyzing philosophical issues that are about certain
aspects of ﬁction itself, philosophical ﬁctionalism employs the notion of
ﬁction in order to resolve certain philosophical puzzles or paradoxes that
arise from some putatively problematic discourse.2 Our focus in this section
will be on philosophical ﬁctionalism as developed for one discourse, that of
mathematics or number-talk.
1 The position we argue for (conditionally) here thus identiﬁes a rather different relation
between T-deﬂationism and ﬁctionalism about truth than that claimed in certain earlier
discussions of alethic ﬁctionalism. Both Beall (2003) and Woodbridge (2005) present
their respective ﬁctionalist accounts of truth (or truth-talk) as versions of T-deﬂationism,
in competition with other, nonﬁctionalist versions of T-deﬂationism. The central thesis
developed here is also different from the conclusion argued for in Armour-Garb &
Woodbridge (2010), which attempts to establish that T-deﬂationists should endorse spe-
ciﬁcally a pretense account of truth-talk. The more general position developed here
allows T-deﬂationists a broader range of options within ﬁctionalism about truth and thus
is not hostage to objections particular to any speciﬁc version of the approach, including
the objection that Armour-Garb & Woodbridge (2010) considers. By contrast, the objec-
tions that we take up below are directed at bigger picture concerns regarding a general
identiﬁcation of T-deﬂationism with ﬁctionalism about truth. Price (2003) also brieﬂy
suggests such a general identiﬁcation (p. 189), but the position we (conditionally) advo-
cate here differs from his views because we do not take such an identiﬁcation to under-
mine the very distinction between ﬁctionalism and nonﬁctionalism, the way Price (Ibid.)
does. See endnote 32, for more on this point.
2 Of course not all of the discourse must be problematic, but at least some fragment of
the discourse will be. For what follows, please read ‘discourse’ as, in effect, denoting a
fragment of discourse.
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1.1. Yablo’s Figuralism
In “The Myth of the Seven”, Yablo (2005) argues for a ﬁctionalist account
of mathematical discourse, one that, if Yablo is correct, would improve
upon Hartry Field’s (1980, 1989) brand of mathematical ﬁctionalism, given
certain reasons for worrying about Field’s own account (for some of the
worries, see Shapiro (1983) and Yablo (2005), among others). One of the
chief premises Yablo offers in support of his ﬁctionalism about number-talk
is the thesis of expressive indispensability, viz.,
(EI) We need to enlist certain aspects of X-talk, as a means for expressing
certain claims that we could not otherwise express.
According to Yablo (Ibid.), in the case speciﬁcally of number-talk, we
need to enlist number-terms, which appears to commit us to numbers as
objects, as a means for expressing certain claims (to be discussed below)
that we otherwise could not—or, at least, could not so easily—express. But
what we are trying to say through our use of number-talk has nothing to do
with numbers per se and, in fact, but for certain expressive limitations,
could be expressed without appeal to numbers at all. Moreover, such
expressive needs have nothing to say about numbers—their nature or even
their existence—or about whether there even need to be any, in order to use
number-terms to express what we aim to convey. So, while number-talk
appears to be expressively indispensable, numbers, qua objects, may well be
theoretically dispensable.
To make this point, Yablo (ibid., p. 94) considers a case in which a
physicist who is studying escape velocity wants to formulate a statement
about it that covers an inﬁnity of particular facts about the trajectories of
certain objects in particular gravitational ﬁelds. In order to be able to
express the inﬁnitely many facts in ﬁnite fashion, the physicist quantiﬁes
over numbers to produce:
(B) For all positive real numbers M and R, the escape velocity from a
sphere of mass M and a diameter 2R is the square root of 2GM/R, where
G is the gravitational constant.
What (B) does is gather together, into a single statement, uncountably
many facts the expression of which would otherwise require an uncount-
ably inﬁnite number of substitution instances of a schematic statement
form. Since it is in principle impossible to write down or assert the un-
countably many sentences that we would need to, if we wanted to
express certain physical laws or regularities, it seems that we need to be
able to quantify over real numbers. But, as Yablo (Ibid.) points out, in
this example the physicist appears to invoke numbers for expressive
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reasons only, given that what she is trying to convey has nothing to do
with numbers.3
In this case, enlisting number terms is advantageous, since it enables the
physicist to express the inﬁnitely many facts without requiring an uncount-
able inﬁnity of sentences, each of inﬁnite length. But to do this, number-
terms only need to serve as aids in representing something that neither
involves, nor presupposes, the existence of numbers. As Yablo notes, since
what the physicist is trying to express has nothing to do with numbers, and
since the real existence of numbers would neither help nor hinder under-
standing of what she is trying to get across, we have no reason to go on to
conclude that, therefore, numbers exist.
1.2. From Truth-Talk to Number-Talk
Yablo sees, in the expressive role that number-talk affords, an analogy with
a T-deﬂationist’s claim about truth-talk. As he (2005, p. 95) notes, on the
assumption that the truth-predicate plays a merely expressive role, as a
device that facilitates the expression of opaque endorsement towards state-
ments to which we cannot express our commitment directly (say, by just
asserting them), there is “[n]o need then to take the truth-predicate ontologi-
cally seriously; its place in the language is secured by a role it can ﬁll quite
regardless of whether it picks out a property.” And, making the connection
between a deﬂationary account of truth and his own view regarding the
expressive role of number-talk, he suggests that “[j]ust as truth is an essen-
tial aid in the expression of facts not about truth (there is no such property)
[according to the T-deﬂationist], perhaps numbers are an essential aid in the
expression of facts not about numbers (there are no such things)” (ibid.).
Yablo (Ibid.) goes on to argue that because a T-deﬂationist like Field
will conclude that there is no reason to take the truth-predicate ontologically
seriously, since he sees ‘true’ as a device that exists purely “to serve a
certain logical need” (Cf. Field, 1994, p. 264; 2008, p. 18), Field might
have allowed that the same is true of number-terms, if, as Yablo has main-
tained, number-talk likewise serves an expressive role that it could ﬁll,
regardless of whether number-terms actually pick out any objects. Field
might thus have concluded that, while number-talk is expressively indis-
pensable, it can ﬁll that role quite regardless of whether number-terms pick
out any objects at all (let alone numbers!).
Now, while Yablo argues that, in light of these considerations, Field
might have argued for a different sort of ﬁctionalist account of number-talk,
3 Yablo (Ibid.) notes that number-talk is invoked since the facts, if fully expressed without
appeal to numbers, would require the introduction—as well as the employment—of
uncountably many predicates, together with an uncountable number of sentences of, to
make things worse, inﬁnite length.
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it bears noting something that Yablo does not consider, viz., that the consid-
erations that he musters, in support of a ﬁctionalist view of mathematics, if
plausible, might likewise motivate a ﬁctionalist view of truth. That is, rather
than (or along with) seeing Field’s allegiance to the exhaustively expressive
role of the truth-predicate as suggesting a Yablo-style ﬁctionalist account of
number-talk, T-deﬂationists might see Yablo’s appeal to ﬁctionalism in
explaining the exhaustively expressive role of number-talk as suggesting a
ﬁctionalist view of truth-talk. Thus, if the impetus for adopting this sort of
ﬁctionalist view about some way of talking turns on adopting some kind of
expressive stance towards some feature of the discourse, and if Yablo is
right about number-talk (and, again, we are assuming that he is), then
perhaps we can ﬁnd compelling reason for endorsing the claim that would-
be T-deﬂationists should be ﬁctionalists about truth (or rather, truth-talk).
This is what we shall argue, in §3. Prior to making this case, however, we
must ﬁrst get clearer on deﬂationism about truth.
2. Deﬂationism in General
Deﬂationary approaches (or accounts, views, etc.) are usually characterized
negatively, by specifying features a given expression lacks. More generally,
a deﬂationary approach will typically accept some discourse or concept
without granting certain metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions
that are commonly associated with it. Such an approach accepts and
explains some fragment of a discourse, while obviating the need for postu-
lating a theory that would require special epistemic access or a putatively
dubious metaphysics, while still granting that there is a role or function for
that part of the discourse.
Although in the last century much work has been done on truth, there
was, at least initially, an assumption—that there is some thing about which
we should be theorizing. T-deﬂationists essentially deny this assumption.
That is, they deny that there is something there to theorize about, which is
not to say that there is no room for theorizing. One who adopts T-deﬂation-
ism replaces the traditional question of what truth is with the question of
what the expression ‘true’ does. But she does not attempt to replace an ear-
lier theory of truth with a new one; rather, part of the view involves con-
vincing us that no such theory is needed at all.4
4 Stephen Leeds (1995, p. 4) takes T-deﬂationism to be “the simple denial that we need a
theory about the relations between language and world.” Understood in this way, the
chief question that gets raised is whether, with respect to the notion of truth, the philoso-
phy of language is essentially complete, as a T-deﬂationist about truth will contend, or
whether it is still in its infancy on this issue. Leeds’s account of what T-deﬂationism
amounts to makes it seem that it is a purely negative thesis, but this is just because he is
contrasting T-deﬂationism with the correspondence theory of truth.
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For our purposes, we may take deﬂationary accounts of truth to comprise
four features, the conjunction of which we will call T-deﬂationism’s core
commitment.5 One who does not endorse a deﬂationary view of truth (for
example, inﬂationists, though, of course, not all non-deﬂationists must be
inﬂationists) denies at least one of the features of the core commitment.
These features are as follows: the property thesis, the concept thesis, the
term thesis, and the rule thesis.6
The property thesis holds that there is no genuinely substantive property
of truth, if there is a property of truth at all.7 The concept thesis holds that
there are no conceptual connections that would, or, indeed, could, serve to
elucidate the concept of truth at a more fundamental level. On this view, there
are no “deep” connections between the concept of truth and other concepts
(e.g., belief, knowledge, assertion, meaning) such that the details of the latter
would shed light on the former. According to the term thesis, the expressions
‘true’ and ‘false’ serve as devices of semantic descent and are crucial for
expressing inﬁnite conjunctions and disjunctions. Finally, the rule thesis
holds that the direct use of some putative truth-bearer and an ascription of
truth to it are intersubstitutable in all extensional (or “transparent”) contexts.
We have said that any view of truth that subscribes to these four theses
shall count as a deﬂationary view of truth. But how are we to understand
the relationship between deﬂationism about truth and a particular deﬂation-
ary theory, or account, of truth? And what are the important distinctions
between, say, disquotationalism and inference-rule deﬂationism?
Disquotationalists, who take as theoretically basic the instances of the
T-schema,
(T) ‘S’ is true iff S,
are properly characterized as T-deﬂationists, though not all T-deﬂationists
are, or need be, disquotationalists. In addition, Minimalists, who take each
(non-pathological) instance of the Equivalence Schema,
5 Our claim is that this core commitment is sufﬁcient, though it need not be necessary, for
one to be taken to be a T-deﬂationist. For more on this core commitment, see Armour-
Garb (2012).
6 We should say now that much of what we have said carries over directly to talk about
falsity. Hence, T-deﬂationists typically accept a property, concept, term and rule view
for falsity as well.
7 Since we are just setting out the view, we will not have anything to say about what it is
for an expression to express a property that is substantive (nor shall we have anything to
say about the expression-relation). That said, it is standard to hold that for a property to
be substantive is for it to possess an underlying nature. (For a discussion, see Horwich
(1998a, Ch. 3; 1998b, Ch. 4).) Of course, if we are happy to allow that some meaningful
predicates fail to express any properties at all, then the need to characterize properties as
either “substantive” or not may well become otiose.
6 BRADLEY ARMOUR-GARB AND JAMES A. WOODBRIDGE
(ES) <p> is true iff p,
(where ‘p’ serves as a sentential variable that can be replaced by any
declarative (English) sentence, and where the angle brackets, ‘<’ and ‘>’,
serve as a device for nominalizing any sentence that goes in for ‘p’) to be
conceptually, explanatorily, and logically fundamental also endorse T-def-
lationism.8 But the same holds for advocates of inference-rule deﬂation-
ism, whose theory of truth comprises the inference-rules, ‘True’-In and
‘True’-Out, viz.,
‘True’-In: p ⇒ T(<p>)
‘True’-Out: T(<p>) ⇒ p,
where ‘⇒’ can be understood as representing an inference rule, or as captur-
ing a substitution rule, to the effect that, in all extensional/transparent con-
texts, one can intersubstitute ‘<p> is true’ (‘p’) for ‘p’ (‘<p> is true’).
Now, while a T-deﬂationist will likely adopt a particular account of truth
(or, more precisely, of truth-talk, that fragment of discourse that centers
around use of the truth- and falsity-predicates), her doing so is different
from her endorsement of T-deﬂationism. As such, objections peculiar to a
given deﬂationary account of truth, while potentially serious, are not, ipso
facto, objections to T-deﬂationism in general. For this reason, our focus, in
what follows here, will be on T-deﬂationism, understood as a genus, rather
than on any of the species of deﬂationary accounts of truth.9
2.1. The (Actual) Role of ‘True’
As a number of philosophers have pointed out, there are certain cases in
which the truth- (and falsity-) predicate seems to be expressively indispens-
able. For example, consider a ‘true’-free theory, τ, understood as a collec-
tion of sentences that is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable, and say that we are
committed to τ. Question: How can we express our commitment to it?
We certainly cannot express our commitment to τ by asserting singly
each of its members. What we want is a device that will enable us to
express, in a ﬁnite manner, the same commitment that we would express,
per impossibile, by singly asserting all of τ’s members. And, with the truth-
predicate, we can do just that—by asserting that all members of τ are
true. Similarly, we can deny a theory, even if we cannot pinpoint which of
its particular claims we reject—by asserting that not all members of τ
8 Horwich (1998a, pp. 121, 126-128, 138).
9 For a comprehensive account of the varieties of T-deﬂationism, see Armour-Garb
(2012).
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are true.10 Finally, we can acknowledge the contingency of τ, while
expressing commitment to it—by asserting that any member of τ could
have failed to be true (Cf. Field, 1994, p. 265).
T-deﬂationists and non-T-deﬂationists alike recognize the truth-predi-
cate’s role in completing or performing these expressive tasks. But many
T-deﬂationists have gone further. While they claim, as they should, that, in
the case of expressing our commitment to τ, the truth-predicate is facilitat-
ing, or aiding in, the expression of opaque endorsement, they go further and
claim that the truth-predicate is a device of opaque endorsement, or, some-
times, that it is a device of generalization. A related claim sometimes made
is that the truth-predicate is a device of inﬁnite conjunction and disjunction
(Ibid., p. 264; Field, 2008, p. 210). But the truth-predicate is not a device of
opaque endorsement, nor is it a device of generalization or of inﬁnite
conjunction and disjunction. Rather, together with other machinery (notably,
quantiﬁers and variables), the truth-predicate can serve as a device for
expressing endorsement (indeed, for expressing opaque endorsement), and
it, together with a quantiﬁer, can serve as a device for expressing general-
izations or inﬁnite conjunctions and disjunctions.11 But if T-deﬂationists
should not identify the truth-predicate with these particular roles, how
should they think about that predicate?
We can say something about what kind of device ‘true’ is if we consider
what the truth-predicate has to be like, in order for it to perform the
aforementioned roles. Here we endorse a slightly generalized version of the
account offered by Quine (1986). In setting out his disquotational account,
Quine discusses the role of the truth-predicate in canceling out the semantic
ascent achieved by forming the quotation name of a sentence. More gener-
ally, what the truth-predicate does is to undo some nominalization of a
content-vehicle, where this nominalization can occur in a number of ways.12
In addition to forming the quotation name of a sentence, some of the
other (familiar) ways of nominalizing a sentence include: forming some
structural description of a sentence uttered; forming a ‘that’-clause of a
sentence that is/could be uttered or that expresses the content of a mental
state; offering a deﬁnite description of an utterance or mental state; etc. These
operations all result in ascent, viz., from the use of a content-vehicle to
express that content to a kind of mention of the vehicle. The truth-predicate
10 We reject a given theory when we reject at least one of its claims. But we sometimes
wish to express our denial of a theory without knowing which of its claims ought to be
denied. When the theory is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable, the falsity-predicate (or the truth-
predicate, coupled with negation) ends up being expressively indispensable, if we are to
express our commitment against the theory.
11 As Quine (1986) notes, all we need is the truth-predicate and suitable quantiﬁers, and
that will allow us to generalize over a body of claims.
12 Cf. Horwich (1998a), where he talks about ‘true’ as a device of denominalizaion.
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undoes this ascent to provide something equivalent to the direct presentation
of the content that attaches to the content-vehicle.
We will use the expression ‘semantic descent’ to capture this operation
of the truth-predicate in general. Now, being a device of semantic descent is
part of what allows the truth-predicate to serve the useful functions that it
does. It is a device of semantic descent which, when coupled with other
resources (e.g., quantiﬁers, descriptions, etc.), can be employed to express
opaque endorsement, enabling its users to express agreement with (or per-
haps indirectly co-assert) a certain body of claims, as might appear, for
example, in a theory like τ. In addition, the truth-predicate’s function, as a
device of semantic descent, also allows it to serve in the expression of inﬁ-
nite conjunctions and disjunctions, in the performance of a kind of “general-
izing role”.13
3. From a Fictionalist View of Number-Talk to a Fictionalist View of
Truth-Talk
Having clariﬁed some basic features of T-deﬂationism, we now draw the
connection between Yablo’s considerations in favor of ﬁctionalism about
number-talk and analogous ones in favor of T-deﬂationists adopting ﬁctional-
ism about truth-talk. In order to make this connection, we will draw a parallel
between the expressive advantages of number-talk and those of truth-talk.
Having done this, we will go on to show that we can redeploy Yablo’s
considerations so as to support ﬁctionalism about truth-talk. We will begin
by returning to the expressive advantages of number-talk.
3.1. The Expressive Roles of Number-Talk and Truth-Talk
As Yablo (2005, pp. 94–5) notes,
To express the inﬁnitely many facts in ﬁnite compass, we bring in num-
bers as representational aids. We do this despite the fact that what we are
trying to get across has nothing to do with numbers, and could be
expressed without them were it not for the requirement of a ﬁnitely based
notation.
Now, in order to forge a link between Yablo’s argument for a ﬁctionalist
view of number-talk and a related one in favor of a ﬁctionalist view of
truth-talk, it bears noting that, for a T-deﬂationist, the very thing that Yablo
presses, with respect to number-talk, can also be said about the expressive
advantages of truth-talk. Indeed, we might ape his claim as follows:
13 For more on the claim that, for a T-deﬂationist, the truth-predicate is a device of
semantic descent (rather than being a device of generalization, or blind, or opaque,
endorsement), see Armour-Garb (2012).
FROM MATHEMATICAL FICTIONALISM TO TRUTH-THEORETIC FICTIONALISM 9
To express the inﬁnitely many conjuncts (or disjuncts) in a ﬁnite compass,
we bring in the notion of truth as a representational aid. We do this despite
the fact that what we are trying to get across has nothing to do with truth,
and could be expressed without truth-talk were it not for the requirement
of a ﬁnitely based notation.
Put differently, Yablo privileges the expressive utility of number-talk,
claiming that, once we see how number-talk functions, as a means for
facilitating the expression of facts not about numbers that we cannot
(given our ﬁnitude) express, we will see that there is no reason to grant
the real existence of numbers. He further claims that what it takes to
understand number-term-involving statements does not require that we
even accept the real existence of numbers. Moreover, given that the tasks
that number-talk facilitates are purely expressive, there is no need to take
number-talk ontologically seriously, since what enables a number-term-
involving statement to express what it does in no way requires the real
existence of numbers.
But a T-deﬂationist will say the same thing about truth-talk.14 Once we
see how truth-talk functions, as a means for facilitating the expression of
facts (which, in turn, facilitates the expression of our commitment to those
facts), which have nothing to do with truth,15 we will see that there is no
reason to grant that ‘true’ expresses a “substantive” property (or that it
expresses a property at all). A T-deﬂationist will further claim that what it
takes to understand ‘true’-involving statements does not require that we
even accept the real existence of a property of truth. Moreover, given the
expressive tasks that truth-talk facilitates, which are all that T-deﬂationists
will acknowledge, there is no need to take truth-talk ontologically seriously,
since what enables a ‘true’-involving statement to express what it does in
no way requires the real existence of a property of truth.16
We have thus drawn a link between the expressive utility of number-talk
and that of truth-talk. With the link established, we shall turn to the second
consideration, from noting the expressive role of truth-talk to the endorse-
ment of a ﬁctionalist account of truth-talk. Prior to doing so, however, we
14 As should be clear, T-deﬂationists can say the same about the falsity-predicate, e.g., that
what it takes to understand ‘false’-involving statements does not require that we even
accept the real existence of a property of falsity. For what follows, we shall stick with
truth-talk, though it is important to note that whatever we say about that talk, we can
also say about falsity-talk.
15 Cf. Field (1999, p. 533) on the role of truth-talk in expressing what he calls “fertile gen-
eralizations” having nothing to do with truth.
16 It bears noting that if a substantivist could succeed in undermining the T-deﬂationist, he
would do so by claiming that there is some instance of truth-talk where the use of the
truth-predicate really must be taken to attribute such a property, where this appearance
cannot be “explained away” via appeal to the truth-predicate’s expressive roles.
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will brieﬂy characterize the notion of a “representational aid”, which was
employed in establishing the aforementioned link.
3.2. Representational Aids
Thus far, we have simply relied on Yablo’s (2005) brief comments about
representational aids, to wit, that making an utterance employing a represen-
tational aid involves making as if to talk about one thing for the purposes
of talking about something else indirectly. Generalizing slightly beyond the
idea just of “thing-talk” representational aids, we also characterized serving
as a representational aid as serving in the indirect expression of certain facts
by seeming to express other putative facts (alternatively: apparent states of
affairs).17 In order to clarify the notion of a representational aid, we will
begin by considering some common modes of speaking in which indirect
expression is already fairly familiar and explain the senses in which per-
forming that indirect expression makes some part of the discourse a repre-
sentational aid. Having done so, we will then explain the ways in which the
truth-predicate appears to function as a representational aid.
To start, consider a common idiom, as might appear in a sentence like
(1) Bob put that project on the back burner.
When we assert (1), certain training with the ‘back burner’ locution allows
us to use it to express facts about the project in question other than those
pertaining to its location on a stove.18 On a surface-level or “face-value”
reading, an assertion of (1) appears to represent certain stove-location states
of affairs, but we actually take the expression of certain other (non-stove-
related) states of affairs to be the point of making the assertion. These other
states of affairs are somewhat complicated and open-ended, involving such
elements as Bob moving his attention away from the project in question to
focus on something else, while still not considering Bob (to take himself) to
be ﬁnished with the project in question, along with thinking that Bob will
(or: plans to) resume focusing on that project again in the future, has not
abandoned the project, etc. Explaining the status of Bob’s project directly
would be somewhat long-winded and would, inevitably, also involve
17 We do not have in mind any particular view about states of affairs and intend them in
the most benign sense—as ways things could be. So, for example, we might say that the
state of affairs that gets expressed by an assertion of ‘Isabel loves Zev’ is just Isabel lov-
ing Zev. Talk of states of affairs (like that of apparent “facts”) can raise some thorny
issues (e.g., negative states of affairs). Since we are not resting anything on either the
proper analysis of, or even the real existence of, so-called “states of affairs” (or: “facts”),
we can leave any such thorny issues aside.
18 Idioms are especially interesting here, since it is not entirely clear that they involve
explicitly ﬁgurative discourse. For more on idioms, see Egan (2008).
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subtleties that can be difﬁcult to express. The ‘back burner’ idiom avoids
the long-windedness, permitting the expression of all of this in a quick, easy
(and colorful) way. In so doing, it serves as an aid in the expression (or:
the representation) of more complicated states of affairs, by appearing on
the surface to express some other, simpler state of affairs. We can thus see
the “expressive advantage” of the exploitation of idioms—as an indirect
way of expressing certain states of affairs that might be more difﬁcult to
express directly.
In the case just considered, the surface-level, apparently represented state
of affairs is a locution-independent, potentially real situation that gets
expressed on the surface of the assertion by means of the central locution at
work. While this seems to hold in many, if not all, cases of idiomatic dis-
course (and ditto for many cases of metaphorical discourse), there are also
fragments of discourse in which the states of affairs that are apparently
expressed (on a surface reading of the sentence asserted) cannot be taken as
a locution-independent, potentially real situation.
As an example of this latter sort of case, consider an assertion of a sen-
tence such as
(2) Mary came to the party only for Bob’s sake.
On a direct, face-value reading of an assertion of (2), the use of the locu-
tion ‘sake’ seems to function in the expression of what we might call a
sake-involving state of affairs. As a result, it appears to commit the speaker
to the existence of sakes. But there are no such things (ex hypothesi), and,
as a consequence, there are no potentially real, sake-involving states of
affairs. There are no uses of the ‘sake’ locution for which “sakes” are the
real point. Thus, what ‘sake’-talk seems to express on the surface, e.g.,
what a face-value reading of (2) seems to yield (certain sake-involving
states of affairs), is even further removed (in the sense of not even being
potentially real) from the states of affairs that the expression actually serves
to represent.
The states of affairs that ‘sake’-talk actually serves to represent are of a
different and more complicated sort; and the point of ‘sake’-talk is to
operate as an aid in expressing them. The talk seems to provide a neat and
simple means for indirectly expressing some possibly complex states of
affairs that involve various interconnected elements, including, at the very
least, things like someone’s welfare, his interests, his emotional states, and
a range of relations between them. Thus, as with the idiom case involving
(1), the central locution here also serves as a sort of expressive aid, contrib-
uting to the indirect representation of some rather complicated states of
affairs in a concise, easy way. It does this by operating in (2) to make it
appear, “on the surface”, that the speaker who assertorically utters (2)
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expresses some simpler state of affairs, to wit, some sake-involving states
of affairs. In short, what we mean, by claiming that certain expressions
function as “representational aids”, is that (presumably via various mecha-
nisms, though we shall have nothing to say about those in this paper) when
they occur in some sentences, they aid in the expression of states of affairs
other than those that the sentences asserted appear to represent on the
surface. Moreover, we take it that at least one important role for expressions
that serve as representational aids is that they facilitate the indirect expres-
sion of certain states of affairs that cannot be easily expressed directly.
Having clariﬁed, to some extent, the notion of a representational aid, we
return to Yablo, in order to forge an important argument parallel.
3.3. Drawing the Argument Parallels
Yablo (2005) claims that one of the reasons for adopting ﬁctionalism about
number-talk is this. First, say that we can explain the expressive advantage
of appealing to number-talk, viz., to “bring in numbers as representational
aids”, and suppose, further, that these expressive purposes exhaust our use
of that talk to say anything about the world. Suppose, ﬁnally, that what we
are trying to get across through our use of number-talk is not about num-
bers, in the sense that what we aim to convey itself has nothing to do with
numbers. In that case, because number-terms—in number-talk—serve essen-
tially in the indirect expression of facts that are not about numbers, Yablo
contends that we should recognize that the talk accomplishes this feat
through the operation of ﬁction. Functioning as a representational aid in this
way—making as if to represent one thing for the purposes of representing
something else, indirectly—just is to operate via some element of ﬁction.
Now, we are assuming that Yablo is right that if number locutions oper-
ate as representational aids, then we have a compelling reason for conclud-
ing that number-talk operates through some element of ﬁction. Accordingly,
in order to resist Yablo’s conclusion, regarding the proper stance to take
with respect to number-talk, the burden of proof is on the realist, who must
deliver at least one statement in which number-terms serve essentially in the
expression of facts that really are about numbers. If none is forthcoming,
we have a reason for endorsing ﬁctionalism about number-talk.19
We can make a parallel argument, given certain assumptions about how
truth-talk functions. First, say that we can explain the expressive advantages
19 One might object, claiming that if no statement is forthcoming in which number-terms
serve in the expression of facts that are about numbers, then all that this shows is that we
have a reason for endorsing some sort of an anti-realist account. That may be true. But
remember that the considerations that we are adducing are Yablo’s and, for him, if no such
statement is forthcoming, we have a reason for endorsing—indeed, for adopting—a
ﬁctionalist view of that talk.
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of appealing to truth-talk, and suppose, further, that these expressive
purposes exhaust our use of that talk. Suppose, ﬁnally, that what we are
trying to get across through our use of truth-talk is not about any property
of truth in the sense that what we aim to convey itself has nothing to do
with any such property. In that case, because ‘true’—the notion, as it occurs
in truth-talk—serves essentially in the indirect expression of facts that are
not about truth, it functions as a representational aid (in Yablo’s sense) and
thus operates through some element of ﬁction. In order to resist this conclu-
sion, the burden of proof is on the objector, who must deliver at least one
statement in which truth-talk plays an essential role in the expression of
facts that really involve truth. That is, to resist this line of thought, she must
deliver at least one statement in which ‘true’ appears and in which the use
of ‘true’ does not serve a merely expressive role, but instead operates essen-
tially in the expression of facts that really involve a property of truth. If
none is forthcoming, we have a reason for endorsing ﬁctionalism about
truth-talk.20
Notice that the initial assumptions that drove the parallel (viz., regarding
the exhaustively expressive role of ‘true’) just are the claims accepted by
T-deﬂationists, regarding the actual functioning of the truth-predicate. T-
deﬂationists acknowledge the expressive indispensability of truth-talk, but
they do not then go on to conclude that the truth-predicate is “ontologically
serious”. Rather, they hold that the truth-predicate functions as a device that
allows speakers to talk indirectly about something else, facilitating the
expression of facts that are not about truth. Accordingly, in order to resist
T-deﬂationism, the burden of proof is on the T-inﬂationist (or T-substantivist),
who must deliver at least one statement in which truth-talk plays an essen-
tial role in the expression of facts that really involve truth.21 That is, to
resist T-deﬂationism, the T-inﬂationist must deliver at least one statement in
which ‘true’ appears and in which the use of ‘true’ does not serve a merely
expressive role, but instead operates essentially in the expression of facts
that really involve a substantive property of truth. If none is forthcoming,
we have a reason for endorsing T-deﬂationism.22
20 One might object, claiming that if no statement is forthcoming in which some truth-locu-
tion serves in the expression of facts that really involve truth, then all that this shows is
that we have a reason for endorsing some sort of an anti-realist account of truth-talk.
That may be true. But remember that the considerations that we are adducing are
Yablo’s and, for him, if no such statement is forthcoming, we have a reason for endors-
ing—indeed, for adopting—a ﬁctionalist view of that talk.
21 One might further claim that, in order to ensure that the property of truth is substantive
(not etiolated, as some T-deﬂationists’ “thin” notion of the property is), there must be a
‘true’-involving sentence, S, whose truth-value turns on whether ‘true’, as it functions in
S, expresses a property that is possessed by the object that S’s referring expression puta-
tively denotes.
22 Cf. Field (1994) on what he calls “methodological deﬂationism”.
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Whatever one thinks about the prospects for T-deﬂationism, our point
here is that, in their dispute with T-inﬂationists, T-deﬂationists characterize
the role of the truth-predicate in a manner akin to the way Yablo describes
the role of number-terms in his argument, viz., as a representational aid. We
can see this at work in T-deﬂationism when we consider that, from a
“sentence-level” perspective, the surface form of any instance of truth-talk
makes it appear that the truth-predicate serves to do something other than
perform a merely expressive role. In our inferential and linguistic practices,
‘is true’ appears to function predicatively. On analogy with other predicative
fragments of discourse, it therefore seems, at least on the surface, to repre-
sent a state of affairs that involves some object having or lacking the
putative property that the predicate appears to express. In particular, then, in
paradigmatic cases of truth-talk (and we think, for example, of “blind” or of
quantiﬁcational ascriptions of ‘true’), this locution appears to serve in the
expression of truth-involving states of affairs—ones that involve a property
of truth.
Of course, T-deﬂationists will deny that the truth-predicates actually does
what it appears on the surface to do, since they will maintain that, really,
there are no truth-involving states of affairs of any sort. Moreover, they will
deny that the point of employing the locution is to express any truth-involv-
ing states of affairs. They will point out that in such truth-attributions, the
truth-predicate is always functioning as a means for indirectly expressing
non-truth-involving states of affairs. As in the case of sakes, truth is never
the point, and, as with instances of ‘sake’-talk, what is apparently expressed
on the surface of an instance of truth-talk (viz., some truth-involving state
of affairs) is not even a potentially real, locution-independent, state of
affairs.
The particular task that T-deﬂationism takes the truth-predicate to perform
is semantic descent. The locution performs this operation on nominalizations
of sentential content-vehicles. These nominalizations are the expressions
that, in the instances of truth-talk, appear to pick out the objects about which
truth-talk seems, on its surface, to express truth-involving states of affairs.
But the truth-predicate’s semantic descent function of “denominalizing” a
sentence nominalization converts the nominalization’s mention of a sentence
into something content-equivalent to a use of that sentence, thereby effecting
the expression of the states of affairs that such a use would express directly.
The more interesting instances of truth-talk are those that do not involve a
“transparent” nominalization of some content-vehicle, but instead effect
“blind” ascription (or quantiﬁcational ascription). In such cases, the denomi-
nalization effected yields something more complicated.
Consider, for example, what a T-deﬂationist would say about the opera-
tion of the truth-predicate in a blind ascription, as in an assertoric utterance
of
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(3) What Bob said is true.
On one standard reading, this sentence is, or amounts to, a compressed
quantiﬁcational claim of the form
(4) There is some x, such that Bob said x and x is true.
T-deﬂationists will analyze the operation of the truth-predicate in a claim
like (4) in terms of its central role of performing semantic descent on nomi-
nalizations of sentential content-vehicles. Since such nominalizations (which
we can symbolize with ‘<p>’, understood as explained above) can also be
taken to pick out the things that Bob can say, T-deﬂationists will understand
uses of (4) as a means for expressing something along the lines of
(5) For some <p>, Bob said <p>, and <p> is true.
Now, since what semantic descent does is to undo the nominalization of
some nominalized content-vehicle, thereby effecting the use of the content-
vehicle’s content, the real point of (5) (and thus of (3)), according to T-def-
lationists, is the expression of something we might try to capture with the
quasi-formal sentence schema
(6) For some p, Bob said <p> and p.23
However, because (6) involves schematic variables for sentence-in-use posi-
tions (in its second conjunct) and a substitutional quantiﬁer, the closest we
could come in natural language, without employing the truth-predicate (as
in (5)), to expressing what we want to cover with (6), would require reeling
off an inﬁnite disjunction along the lines of
(7) Either Bob said that crabapples are edible and crabapples are edible, or
Bob said that the moon is made of cheese and the moon is made of
cheese, or Bob said that corporations are not people and corporations are
not people, or Bob said that birds are dinosaurs and birds are dinosaurs, or
Bob said that 2 is the only even prime number and 2 is the only even
prime number, or…24
In this way, what an assertoric utterance of (3) enables a speaker to express
indirectly is a commitment to certain complicated non-truth-involving states
of affairs, the direct expression of which would require something like (7).
23 Cf. Ibid., p. 264 on T-deﬂationism taking a claim like (3) to express something like what
we want to express with (6).
24 Cf. Ibid. on T-deﬂationism taking a schema like (6) to express something equivalent to
an inﬁnite disjunction of all of its instance.
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But this is to say that, for T-deﬂationists, in an assertion of (3), the truth-
predicate, as it occurs in that sentence, aids in the representation of such
complicated non-truth-involving states of affairs, allowing speakers to
express, in an easy and ﬁnite way, something complicated (and not involv-
ing any property of truth) that they otherwise could not express at all, given
their ﬁnitude.
Now, a T-deﬂationist will contend that since the immediate function of
the truth-predicate is just to effect semantic descent, the truth-predicate itself
does not express anything at all and, a fortiori, does not express any prop-
erty of truth.25 Moreover, while she will maintain that the operation of the
truth-predicate, in instances of truth-talk, does make the putative truth-attri-
bution perform the task of expressing—indirectly—certain states of affairs,
she will also point out that such states of affairs do not in any way involve
a property of truth. Put in the vocabulary that we favor, it is a central point
of T-deﬂationism that serving this role makes the truth-predicate serve as an
expressive aid, allowing speakers to express (and, thus, to represent) states
of affairs that they otherwise would not be able to express.
So, although the truth-predicate seems on the surface to serve in the
direct expression precisely of truth-involving states of affairs, T-deﬂationists
will maintain that the truth-predicate serves only in the indirect expression
of states of affairs that do not involve any property of truth. But, as we
have seen, that sort of indirect “not what it seems on the surface” expressive
functioning—in the service of making it possible (or at least a lot easier) to
express certain complicated states of affairs—is really all that is involved in
a locution serving as a representational aid. That a T-deﬂationist will point
to semantic descent in explaining what the truth-predicate does directly in
no way precludes our claim that, for T-deﬂationists, the truth-predicate func-
tions as a representational aid. In fact, we might go even further and claim
that it is in virtue of the truth-predicate’s role, as a device of semantic
descent, that it ends up functioning as a representational aid.
Given T-deﬂationists’ understanding of the role of the truth-predicate,
they should see it as always serving as a representational aid in the way just
explained, since they (Cf. Field, 1999, p. 533) contend that it always func-
tions as a device that enables speakers to express something that is not
‘true’-involving about something that has nothing to do with any property
of truth. Now, if Yablo is right, that whenever certain locutions of a given
discourse function as representational aids, that discourse operates in virtue
of some element of ﬁction, then, given what we have seen, it follows that
T-deﬂationists should conclude that the functioning of truth-talk involves an
25 Since the T-deﬂationist will not hold that the truth-predicate has the semantic role of rep-
resenting a property, they will also deny that the truth-predicate itself indirectly expresses
something different from what it appears on the surface to express directly.
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element of ﬁction. Put differently, if Yablo is right about number-talk, then
T-deﬂationists should understand truth-talk to function through the operation
of a ﬁction. Given that we are assuming that Yablo’s reasoning compels
with respect to number-talk, it follows that T-deﬂationists should endorse or
adopt a ﬁctionalist account of truth-talk.
4. Objections/Responses
Having made our case, in this section we raise and respond to two possible
objections to our claim, viz., that if Yablo is right that philosophers of
mathematics ought to adopt a ﬁctionalist view about number-talk, then we
have a compelling reason for holding that T-deﬂationists ought to adopt a
ﬁctionalist view about truth-talk.
4.1a. Objection One
It seems reasonable to employ the notion of ﬁction if, as Yablo argues, we
can see number-talk as playing an entirely expressive role. This is because
number-locutions appear to be ontologically committing. But even if we can
see truth-talk in terms of an expressive device, it seems clear that truth-
locutions, being predicates, do not appear to be ontologically committing.
As such, while it may be reasonable to endorse a ﬁctionalist account of
number-talk, the reasons for this do not carry over in support of understand-
ing deﬂationism in terms of ﬁctionalism about truth-talk.26
4.1b. Response to Objection One
We have tried to show that if we were to grant Yablo’s considerations in favor
of a ﬁctionalist account of number-talk, then, for T-deﬂationists, those very
considerations can be employed as a means for supporting a ﬁctionalist account
of truth-talk. The going objection points to a supposed dissimilarity between
number-talk and truth-talk and uses that as a means for denying that the reason
for adopting a ﬁctionalist view of number-talk carries over in support of a
ﬁctionalist view of truth-talk (even assuming T-deﬂationists are right about the
expressive role of truth-talk). In particular, the objection claims that number-
locutions, as singular terms, appear to be ontologically committing, while the
truth-locutions, as predicates, do not appear to be ontologically committing.
Now, we might grant that some instances of number-talk appear to be
ontologically committing, in virtue of the fact that certain uses of number-
locutions appear to refer to objects, while also granting that, at least in
perhaps the most central uses of truth-locutions, they do not appear to refer
26 Thanks to Simon Blackburn for discussion of both the objection and our proposed
response to it.
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to any objects at all. So, we might grant that truth-talk does not appear to
be ontologically committing in exactly the way that number-talk does. But
it certainly does not follow that none of the truth-locutions appears to be
ontologically committing. Indeed, as we will show, some common uses of
some of them do appear to be ontologically committing, which shows that
the going objection must be rejected.
To see an example of this, consider the familiar slogan that belief aims
at truth. In offering this gloss on the nature of belief, we seem committed to
there being something at which it aims—something that the term ‘truth’
denotes and which the term ‘true’ expresses. Similarly, certain non-T-deﬂa-
tionists, following Dummett (1959) (and, more recently, Priest (2006)),
endorse a teleological account of truth the central thesis of which is that
truth is the aim of assertion. Leaving aside the issue of whether an account
of this sort is acceptable (or whether it is properly characterized as “non-
T-deﬂationist”), this central thesis appears to capture something important
about assertion. And in doing so, it appears to commit us to something,
viz., that at which assertions ought to aim.
Whether these ‘truth’-involving claims about belief and assertion have
substantive or non-deﬂationary consequences is irrelevant, for present pur-
poses. What matters here is (i) that each of these ‘truth’-involving state-
ments appears to be ontologically committing, and (ii) that, in all such
cases, T-deﬂationists will claim that the truth-locution employed still serves
just as an expressive device (or, as we would describe things, as a represen-
tational aid).
To resolve the tension between these points, the T-deﬂationist will begin
by noting that both the claim that belief aims at truth and that truth is the
aim of assertion are normative, telling us what we should (or should not)
do.27 As such, the claim about belief’s or assertion’s aim or telos can be
read as saying something like
(a) You should believe/assert something only if it is true.
In turn, (a) enjoins us to believe/assert that snow is white only if, actually,
snow is white; to believe/assert that grass is magenta only if, actually, grass
is magenta; etc.28 To be sure, it seems that we cannot dispense with a
27 Interestingly, Price (2003) maintains that the normative function of the notion of truth is
something that T-deﬂationism (which he understand centrally in terms of a disquotational
view) cannot account for, whereas his ﬁctionalism about truth, an approach he sees as
an alternative to T-deﬂationism, can. Thus, on his view, the normative consideration
blocks an identiﬁcation of T-deﬂationism with ﬁctionalism about truth. As we discuss
below, we do not think T-deﬂationism is so hamstrung with respect to accounting for
the normative role of ‘true’.
28 Cf. Field (1994, p. 265).
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truth-locution here, given the language that we are employing. But such an
expression is merely serving as an aid for expressing something that neither
involves nor presupposes a property of truth.
Notice that a norm such as (a) also yields
(b) If something is not true, then you should not believe/assert it.
This norm, in turn, enjoins us not to believe/assert that snow is green, if
snow is not green, not to believe/assert that grass is magenta, if grass is not
magenta, etc. Moreover, if one does not know that she should not believe/
assert that snails are toxic unless snails are toxic and, more generally, if she
does not know that she should not believe/assert something unless it is true,
we would judge that person to be (semantically) incompetent with the con-
cepts of belief and assertion. In that case, where we would judge a speaker
to be semantically incompetent, we enlist the truth-predicate because of our
expressive limitations. But notice that we would not—at least we would not
obviously, given our teleologist’s main statement—be relying on a property
of truth, in order to be justiﬁed in so judging.29
This is enough to show that the going objection fails. Here is why.
The objector contends that even if it is reasonable to employ a ﬁctionalist
account of number-talk, on the assumption that number-locutions function
as expressive devices, although they appear to be ontologically commit-
ting, the same cannot be said of truth-talk. That is, the objector grants
that T-deﬂationists maintain that truth-locutions function just as expres-
sive devices but denies that they are (or: that they appear to be) ontologi-
cally committing. From this, he concludes that the reasons in support of
a ﬁctionalist view of number-talk do not carry over (assuming T-deﬂa-
tionism) in support of a ﬁctionalist view of truth-talk. But we have just
seen cases of truth-talk in which truth-locutions function as expressive
devices but appear, nevertheless, to be ontologically committing. Thus,
contrary to what the objector contends, the reasons for endorsing ﬁction-
alism about number-talk do carry over in support of ﬁctionalism about
truth-talk.
If one does not ﬁnd the reply just offered convincing (perhaps because
she thinks that, especially for a T-deﬂationist, the prima facie ontologically
committing truth-locutions fail to be genuinely committing or she thinks
they are derivative rather than central), there is another response to the ﬁrst
objection that is available—one that is entirely methodological. The
response is as follows.
29 Hence, we are not convinced that Priest (2006) needs to abide what he describes as the
“teleological account of truth”, if that is to be contrasted with deﬂationary accounts of
that notion. But that is an issue for another paper.
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We can grant that there may be some dissimilarities between number-talk
and truth-talk, but we should go on to note that, in his argument for why we
ought to endorse ﬁctionalism about number-talk, Yablo does not rely on the
aspect of that talk that might be held not to be present in the case of truth-
talk. That is to say, even if there are some dissimilarities, those aspects of
number-talk not present in truth-talk are not “operative” in Yablo’s argument
for a ﬁctionalist account of number-talk. As a result, even if there are some
differences between number-talk and truth-talk, this does not affect our argu-
ment, to the effect that if Yablo’s considerations in favor of a ﬁctionalist
account of number-talk compel, then T-deﬂationists should endorse, and
adopt, a ﬁctionalist account of truth-talk. In order to see why this response
adequately addresses the objection, let us return to Yablo’s chief contention.
Yablo (2005, p. 95) argues that because the expressive role of number-
talk has it serving as “an essential aid in the expression of facts not about
numbers (there are no such things),” we have a reason for endorsing, or
adopting, a ﬁctionalist account of that talk. At base, our claim is that if we
grant Yablo’s (Ibid.) contention, then, because T-deﬂationists hold that
truth-talk functions as an essential aid in the expression of facts not about
truth (there is no such property), we have a reason for endorsing, or adopt-
ing, a ﬁctionalist account of that talk. Accordingly, if we assume that
Yablo’s considerations in favor of a ﬁctionalist account of number-talk com-
pel (and, again, for purposes of this paper, we assume that they do), then
T-deﬂationists have an impetus for endorsing, and adopting, a ﬁctionalist
account of truth-talk. And this is so, even if there are some differences
between number-talk and truth-talk.30
4.2a. Objection Two
In general, philosophical ﬁctionalism about a region, or fragment, of dis-
course, D, is committed to the view that the sentences of D are not literally
true. As such, ﬁctionalists about truth-talk will have to maintain that the
‘true’-involving sentences of that discourse are not literally true. But then it
seems to follow that, on a ﬁctionalist account of that talk, although an utter-
ance of ‘snow is white’ will be deemed correct, an utterance of “‘snow is
white’ is true” will not be deemed correct. This would be a problematic
result for any account of truth, but it seems especially problematic for a
T-deﬂationist, since if ‘snow is white’ is correct (and assertible), while an
ascription of truth to it is not, it seems that we shall have to take the two
sentences quite differently.31
30 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that we clarify this response to the
current objection.
31 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
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4.2b. Response to Objection Two
The objection appears to reveal an incompatibility between certain aspects
of T-deﬂationism (which were touched on in §2) and certain alleged
features of philosophical ﬁctionalist accounts. More speciﬁcally, given
T-deﬂationists’ adherence to a sort of equivalence (at the very least, in
truth-value), between a content-vehicle and an ascription of truth to that
vehicle, if ﬁctionalist accounts of truth-talk will require that in some sense
we deny that equivalence (e.g., by treating the two claims differently), then
perhaps T-deﬂationists ought not, and in fact cannot, embrace philosophical
ﬁctionalism about truth-talk. In particular, the objection assumes that all
philosophical ﬁctionalists are error theorists, maintaining that the sentences
of D are literally false, and goes on to note that this raises doubts about the
plausibility of combining deﬂationism about truth with a ﬁctionalist view of
that talk.32
Now, it is correct that, in one way or another, each of the myriad
strands of philosophical ﬁctionalism will maintain that the sentences of a
relevant discourse are not literally true, but that claim is ambiguous in a
crucial way. The initially proposed ﬁctionalist accounts, e.g., those put
forward by Field (1980, 1989), with respect to mathematical discourse,
Rosen (1990), with respect to modal discourse (regarding possible-worlds-
talk), and perhaps Mackie (1977), with respect to moral discourse, were
error-theoretic in the traditional sense. Such theorists—notably Field
(Ibid.)—held that while the existence-implicating sentences of D are not
literally true, they are still good and worth uttering, since making as if
they are true (or: correct; or: acceptable) can be useful for theoretical
reasons. But not all philosophical ﬁctionalists are error-theorists in that
sense.33
Certain more recent ﬁctionalist accounts employ a pretense-involving
ﬁctionalism—as developed in Walton (1990), Crimmins (1998), Kroon
(1996, 2004, 2005, 2009), and Yablo (1996, 2000, 2001, 2005) (and, in a
32 This “error-theoretic assumption” is also the basis of the worry that Price (2003) consid-
ers, regarding a possible collapse of the ﬁctional-nonﬁctional distinction that ﬁctionalism
about truth might yield, raising the question of whether it is even possible to “formulate
a meaningful…ﬁctionalism about the semantic terms themselves” (p. 188). We maintain
that Price’s concern on this front dissolves for the same reason that the present objection
dissolves, namely because ﬁctionalism about truth need not involve the “error-theoretic
assumption”.
33 To be sure, as Nolan, Restall & West (2005) point out, when discussing a ﬁctionalist
account of moral discourse, “[t]he simplest ﬁctionalist approach to a discourse takes
certain claims in that discourse to be literally false … .” But, ﬁrst, this does not say
anything about all of the sentences of the relevant discourse, and, second, it makes clear
that this is but one ﬁctionalist approach. Note, as well, that Field (1989) also acknowl-
edges other possibilities.
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different sense, Evans (1982))—that should not be read as error-theoretic.34
According to them, an utterance of a sentence from a pretense-involving dis-
course, D, can still express some content about the real world indirectly,
though any such content will be different from what the sentence appears,
on its surface, to say. On such an account, the postulation of pretense at
work in the sentences of D involves maintaining that the content of an utter-
ance so understood—the serious content of such an utterance—should not
be determined by a “face-value” reading of the sentence.35 As a result, the
serious content of such an utterance can be true even if the sentence, taken
literally, would not be true.
So, both species of philosophical ﬁctionalism will grant that sentences of
the relevant discourse are “not literally true”. But some—the error-theoretic
ﬁctionalists—will hold that those sentences are therefore literally not true,
while others—the pretense-involving ﬁctionalists—will hold that while the
sentences would not be true, if literally construed (if they can be literally
construed at all), the serious content of what they express can, in fact, be
true.
This is enough to show that there is a problem with the going objection,
as it shows its assumption to be false: Philosophical ﬁctionalists need not
be error theorists about the sentences of their respective discourses. As such,
philosophical ﬁctionalists about truth-talk need not grant that while ‘snow is
white’ is true, an ascription of truth to it is not.
The current objection is launched at the dictates of a particular species of
ﬁctionalist accounts of truth-talk: error-theoretic accounts. While we have
argued that if Yablo is right then there is a reason for T-deﬂationists to
adopt ﬁctionalism about that talk, in our argument we neither rely on, nor
aim to support, the species of philosophical ﬁctionalism targeted in the
objection. Hence, the objection is misdirected, and, when its real target (or
34 See our (2009), (2012), and (2014) for more on the distinction between error-theoretic
ﬁctionalism (ETF) and pretense-involving ﬁctionalism (PIF). This distinction within
philosophical ﬁctionalism correlates in some ways with the distinction between revolu-
tionary and hermeneutic ﬁctionalism, respectively. (The distinction within ﬁctionalism
was introduced by Stanley (2001), but has its roots in Burgess and Rosen (1997).)
Roughly put, read revolutionary ﬁctionalism as the view that we ought to revise our
understanding of the statements belonging to the discourse and now take them in a
ﬁctional spirit. By contrast, read hermeneutic ﬁctionalism as a thesis regarding actual
discourse, viz., that we actually do make statements belonging to that discourse in a
ﬁctional spirit. The difference matters because, even if all revolutionary ﬁctionalists are
error-theorists, the same is not true of hermeneutic ﬁctionalists. Some, like Yablo
(2005), maintain that in virtue of the “serious content” an utterance of the relevant
discourse has, it can still turn out to be true.
35 In general, on a pretense-involving ﬁctionalist view, a face-value reading will yield only
what the sentence, when uttered, says when it is understood from within the pretense it
involves. For more on the details behind pretense accounts (together with a comparison
with error-theoretic ﬁctionalist views) see our (2014).
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targets) is (are) made clear, it should not be seen as an objection either to
the primary thesis of this paper or, really, to the adoption of some sort of
philosophical ﬁctionalism about truth-talk.36
5. Concluding Remarks
Our starting point was Yablo’s contention that there need not be any num-
bers for number-talk to serve useful, if not crucial, expressive purposes. He
explains number-terms as expressions that provide speakers with a way to
talk indirectly about facts that have nothing to do with numbers, and con-
cludes from this that we should adopt a ﬁctionalist account of number-talk.
Extending Yablo’s recognition of the similarities between his take on
number-talk and T-deﬂationists’ claims about truth-talk, we re-directed his
observation to T-deﬂationism, in order to link that general conception of
truth-talk to ﬁctionalism about truth-talk. As we saw, T-deﬂationists can
explain truth-locutions as expressions that provide speakers with a way to
talk indirectly about facts that have nothing to do with truth. Accordingly,
if Yablo’s considerations in favor of mathematical ﬁctionalism compel, then
it seems that there is a reason for T-deﬂationists to endorse ﬁctionalism
about truth-talk.
What we have not done is to explain how the central expressions of
truth-talk manage to fulﬁll their expressive functions, for explaining that
would require the presentation of a particular account of that talk from the
appropriate species of philosophical ﬁctionalism. In fact, we do favor a
particular ﬁctionalist account of truth-talk.37 But the arguments that we have
presented in this paper neither rely on, nor determine, any particular ﬁction-
alist account of truth-truth as being the one that one ought to endorse in the
service of T-deﬂationism. As such, we leave a discussion of the formulation
of such an account for another time.38
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